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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION IN ILLINOIS:
A NEW CONCEPT
On January 1, 1956, the new Illinois Civil Practice Act will go into ef-
fect. Section 17 of this act which takes a large step forward in the modern
trend to expand jurisdiction over nonresidents reads as follows:
ACTS SUBMITTING TO JURISDICTION-JUDGMENT
IN PERSONAM
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person
or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits
said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the Courts of this State as to any cause of action arising in this State from
the doing of any of said acts.
(a) The transaction of any business within this State.
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State.
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State.
(d) The insuring of any person, property or risk located within this State,
whether the policy is delivered by mail or otherwise.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state, as provided in this section, may be made by personally
serving the summons and a copy of the complaint upon the defendant outside
this State, as provided in this Act, with the same force and effect as though sum-
mons had been personally served within this State.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted
against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this
section.
(4) Nothing herein contained shall limit or affect the right to serve any proc-
ess in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law.1
There is no doubt that this section will bring about many controversies
although it is in line with our modern concepts of jurisdiction.
In early common law the appearance of the defendant was essential and
there would be no jurisdiction over the defendant unless he was within
reach of the sheriff or voluntarily appeared. 2 Because of this fact, the early
courts in determining the validity of foreign judgments in the local courts
assumed that physical power over the defendant's person was a necessary
prerequisite to the validity of the judgment.8
If a court renders a judgment over property or a person beyond its ju-
risdiction, the fundamental principles of the conflict of laws would be dis-
regarded, and that decision would be reversed in the federal courts, for
these principles are protected by two provisions of the United States Con-
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, § 17.
2 2 Holdworth, History of English Law 105 (3d ed., 1923).
3 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
COMMENTS
stitution. A question involving Article IV, section 1, that full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the judicial proceedings of every other
state, would arise when an action is brought on such a judgment in a state
other than where the judgment was rendered. 4 The enforcement of a judg-
ment against a defendant over whom the court had no jurisdiction involves
a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Su-
preme Court decisions on the question of jurisdiction over the defendant
are binding upon the states because of these provisions.
Jurisdiction is based on control by the state.6 To render a judgment in
rem or quasi in rem, the court must have control over the property. For a
long time, it has been held that there must be control of some physical pow-
er over the person of the defendant, in order to get an in personam judg-
ment. States are not allowed to give authority to their courts to reach be-
yond the state limits. To do this would be regarded as an impertinence by
the other states. Mr. Justice Field said in the famous case of Pennoyer v.
Neff:7
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial
limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority
beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by
this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.8
As to parties domiciled in another state, a state could not compel them
to leave the state of their domicile to respond to proceedings brought
against them or impose liabilities upon them because of their failure to
appear. Of course, once a state has acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, this jurisdiction continues throughout all stages of the
action, although the defendant may in the meantime have left the state,
acquired a domicile or citizenship elsewhere, or attempted to withdraw
his consent.9
In an in personam action, it is immaterial whether or not the claim upon
which a judgment was entered arose within the state or that the defendant
had property in the state.10 Constructive service of process of any type
was held insufficient, including personal service upon the nonresident de-
4 Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Dull v. Blackman, 169
U.S. 243 (1898).
5 Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S.
193 (1899).
6 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
795 U.S. 714 (1877).
8 bid., at 720.
9 Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913); Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S. 195
(1860).
'
0De Arman v. Massey, 151 Ala. 639, 44 So. 688 (1907); Easterly v. Goodwin, 35
Conn. 273 (1868).
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fendant outside of the jurisdiction of the court." In order to satisfy due
process, not only actual notice and an opportunity to be heard must be
given but the state also must have some power over the person of the de-
fendant.
Control or power by the state to satisfy the in personam judgment
arises in three basic ways: first, when the defendant is present within the
state; second, when he has consented to the jurisdiction of the state;
third, when he is a citizen or resident of the state.
Personal service can never be dispensed with in an in personam judgment
unless there is a voluntary appearance by the defendant. 12 A personal judg-
ment based on constructive service on a nonresident who does not appear
or otherwise consent to a mode of service is opposed to due process, and is
void in the state where rendered or elsewhere. This rule applies to any
type of constructive or substituted service, whether service by publica-
tion,' 8 or by personal service out of the jurisdiction in which the judg-
ment is rendered. 14 As can be seen, the difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction
over the person of a nonresident does not arise from the inability to give
him notice, but from the principle that process from the tribunals of one
state cannot run into another state and summon parties there domiciled to
leave their territory and respond to proceedings against them.
Some of the earlier cases allowed a judgment in personam over a
nonresident by constructive service to be valid within its own territory
not recognizing the rule as a violation of due process.' It has been
uniformly regarded, after the case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 16 that a personal
judgment against a nonresident who was not served within the state, and
who did not appear or consent, expressly or impliedly, to the mode of
constructive or substituted service adopted, is invalid, even in the state
where rendered.' 7
The doctrine laid down in the Pennoyer case was treated as authority
11 Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41 (1892); Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878);
Denny v. Ashley, 12 Colo. 165, 20 Pac. 331 (1889); Rand v. Hanson, 154 Mass. 87, 28
N.E. 6 (1891); Scott v. Streepy, 73 Tex. 547, 11 S.W. 532 (1889).
12 Knowles v. Logansport Gaslight & Coke Co., 86 U.S. 58 (1873); Bank of China v.
Morse, 168 N.Y. 458,61 N.E. 774 (1901).
18 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1916); Baker v. Baker, 242 U.S. 394 (1916);
Griffin v. Cook County, 369 111. 380, 16 N.E. 2nd 906 (1938); Nelson v. Chicago, B. &
Q. R. Co., 225 Ill. 197, 80 N.E. 109 (1907).
14 Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915); Old Wayne
Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1906); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
15 Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. 350 (1873); Phelps v. Brewer, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 390 (1852).
1695 U.S. 714 (1877).
17 Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923); Pennington v.
Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); Cella Commission Co. v. Bohlinger, 147 Fed.
419 (CA. 8th, 1906).
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on due process. Gradually there developed exceptions to this hard rule. Re-
cently, in the case of Tardiff v. Bank,'8 the court stated:
The landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff ... sets up the requirements of due
process respecting the jurisdiction of a court to render a judgment in personam
against a defendant. One of those requirements is service of process on the de-
fendant within the state. The doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, however, though
venerable and long-revered, is primarily of historical importance today. After
suffering substantial erosion from a series of subsequent decisions, finally, in
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington ... the Supreme Court gave it
a decent burial and found that a due process requires only that in order to sub-
ject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' 9
The new Section 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act is a growth of the
doctrine set down in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.2 0 The Act re-
fers to any person, which includes individuals as well as corporations. Since
the International Shoe Co. case decided the question of jurisdiction over
the corporation, anything said about individuals is necessarily dictum. In
the opinion, the discussion of jurisdiction over foreign corporations was
introduced by references to jurisdiction over individuals. It was stated:
[Niow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.21
The jursdiction over the corporation was held not to be based upon
consent, as was originally the basis for taking jurisdiction over nonresident
corporations "doing business" within the state. The jurisdictional power
over nonresident corporations because of "doing business" within the state
has arisen on three theories. First, jurisdiction has been said to rest upon
the theory of "implied" consent. 2 This line of reasoning is undoubtedly
sound enough in cases in which it is really possible to find evidence of a
valid consent. In most cases, the implication of consent involves a fiction;
but the corporation does not escape on that account. Because of the dif-
ficulty that arose where there was actually no real consent, a second the-
ory was devised whereby corporations were made subject to a state's ju-
risdiction. The corporation was held to be present in the state wherever it
did business, and because of such presence it was subject to the state's ju-
risdiction.2 Even under the "presence" theory, one is in doubt whether
18 127 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La., 1954). 20 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19 Ibid., at 947. 21 bid., at 316.
22 Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899); Lafayette Insurance
Co. v. French, 18 How. (U.S.) 404 (1855).
23Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Rosenberg
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this explanation does not itself involve fiction in assuming corporate pres-
ence. The third theory, and perhaps the most satisfactory upon which to
base a foreign corporation's liability to suit in the state where it is doing
business, is the one used by Judge Learned Hand in Smolik v. Philadelphia
and Reading Coal & Iron Co., 24 and Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert.25
Professor Scott, in discussing these decisions, stated:
If a foreign corporation voluntarily does business within the state it is bound
by reasonable regulations of that business imposed by the state, not because it
is found there, not because it has consented to those regulations, but because it
is reasonable and just to subject the corporation to those regulations as though it
had consented. 26
Under these theories, the corporation must be "doing business" within
the state before it could be subjected to the state's jurisdiction. As to what
is "doing business," the policy of the state, as to how much activity is nec-
essary to be considered as "doing business," is the important factor. The
International Shoe Co; case has changed the "doing business" concept to
one of the "doing of an act." Jurisdiction in personam was constitutionally
acquired because its operation had established "sufficient contacts or ties
with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to our
traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice.127 This new
test of reasonableness and justice involves a balancing of conflicting in-
terests in the same way forum non conveniens is applied.
Because of the doctrine of the International Shoe Co. case, the acts listed
under the new Section 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act would be suffi-
cient to submit a corporation to jurisdiction. The new section applies to
any person, including individuals as well as corporations. Jurisdiction over
nonresident individuals, it is said, cannot be based on the same theory as
corporations because of the privileges and immunities clause of the United
States Constitution which forbids a state from denying nonresidents the
rights and privileges of its own citizens. The new Section 17 submits "Any
person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state," which would
seem to mean that nonresident individuals are not to be discriminated
against, for both residents and nonresidents are subject to the same rule as
to jurisdiction by the doing of the acts specified.
It has been previously stated, that in order for a state to get jurisdiction
over an individual, he must be physically present within the state, domi-
ciled within the state, or he must have consented to the jurisdiction. 28
Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Me-
Kibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
24222 Fed. 148 (S.D.N.Y., 1915). 2545 F. 2d 139 (C.A. 2d, 1930).
26 Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 871, 883 (1919).
27326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). 28 See Goodrich, Conflict of Law § 73 (1949).
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Consent in this sense pertained to an appearance 29 by the defendant or by
his consent in advance such as the common judgment note.3 0
Jurisdiction over individuals is also based on the doing of certain acts by
the individual within the state. The common law would never allow ju-
risdiction because a person committed a tort3l or made a contract 3 2 within
the state.
It can be easily seen that a corporation or other legal entity can be
forced to consent to the court's jurisdiction or the state would forbid the
corporation from doing business within the state. A question arises as to
whether a nonresident individual, as distinguished from a foreign corpora-
tion or other legal entity, in doing business within the state, creates any
excepton to the principle of constitutional law that a nonresident cannot
be subjected to a judgment in personam by form of service of process
other than personal service within the state, voluntary appearance or other
forms of consent.
The early decisions held that a statute providing for services of process
other than personal in an action against a nonresident doing business in the
state, without seizure of his property within the state, is unconstitutional
and void.3 3 The courts held that such nonresident persons, unlike a cor-
poration, carry on business in the state not by virtue of consent, but by
virtue of the Federal Constitution which guarantees to the citizens of each
state all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states; hence, it
cannot be implied from the fact that a person does business within the
state that he consents to submit himself to the jurisdiction of its courts in
personal action on service of process upon his agents.3 4
The United States Supreme Court ruled that a state statute permitting
the service of process on any agent or clerk employed in an office or
agency maintained in the state by a nonresident, in all actions growing out
of or connected with the business of that office or agency, does not
abridge the privileges and immunities or equal protection clauses of the
Federal Constitution.3 5 The statutes requiring one who does business
within the state to consent to service of process upon an agent in actions
29 National Coal Co. v. Cincinnati Gas, Coke, Coal & Mining Co., 168 Mich. 195, 131
N.W. 580 (1911).
30 Hamilton v. Schoenberger, 47 Iowa 385 (1877).
31 Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. The Rajah of Faridkote, [1894] A.C. 670.
32 Emanuel v. Symon, [1908] 1 K.B. 302 (C.A.).
33 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919); Hensley v. Green, 36 F. Supp. 671
(W.D.S.C., 1940); Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 92 N.W. 461 (1902).
34 Hensley v. Green, 36 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.S.C., 1940); Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn.
510,92 N.W. 461 (1902).
35 Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
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arising out of that business are said to fall within the police power of the
state.36
Provisions for substituted service of process on a nonresident motorist
while operating the automobile within the state are deemed constitu-
tional.87 In the case of Kane v. Neiw Jersey,8 s as a condition to the use
of the highways of the state, the actual appointment of a state official
as the agent of the nonresident motorist was required. Also, it has been
said that the using of the highway by the nonresident motorist was deemed
the equivalent of actual appointment of such an official to accept service
of process for the nonresident.8 9
The validity of the nonresident motorist statute is based on the theory
that these statutes are valid exercises of the state's police power. The op-
eration of motor vehicles is said to be fraught with danger and economic
harm to the general public and therefore the state has the right under its
police power to require the submission of a nonresident to substitute serv-
ice of process when the nonresident uses the highway.
The police power of the state has been held to extend to make valid
statutes which give the state jurisdiction over the sellers of corporate se-
curities40 and also over persons who insure a resident of the state or an in-
terest in property within the state.41 Illinois has a nonresident motorist
statute42 and a provision in the Illinois Insurance Code which permits an
Illinois purchaser of insurance to obtain good service against nonresident
defendant vendors.48
Section 10 of the Illinois Securities Law of 1953 provides:
... The sale or delivery of securities in Illinois whether effected by mail or
otherwise, by any person ... shall be equivalent to and shall constitute an ap-
pointment by such person of the Secretary of State of Illinois, or his successors
in office, to be the true and lawful attorney for such person upon whom may
be served all lawful process in any action or proceeding against such person,
arising out of the sale of such securities. 44
86 See Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 Harv.
L. Rev. 871 (1919). As to what constitutes "doing business" see: Kaffenberger v.
Kremer, 63 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Pa., 1945); Tennessee Publishing Co. v. C. L. Walker
& Co., 205 Ky. 420, 265 S.W. 941 (1924); Melvin Pine & Co. v. McConnell, 298 N.Y. 27,
80 N.E. 2d 137 (1948); Miller v. Swann, 176 Misc. 607, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 247 (N.Y. City Ct.,
1941).
87 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927);
Davidson v. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N.W. 700 (1932).
38 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
39 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
40 Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
41 Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938).
42 111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 94V2 § 23.
43 111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 73, § 724. 44111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 121 Y2 §137.10.
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Statutes of this nature all have been held constitutional under the theory
that they are a valid exercise of a state's police power in protecting its own
citizens. The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws states:
A court by proper service of process may acquire jurisdiction over an individ-
ual not domiciled within the state who does acts or owns things in a state which
are of a sort dangerous to life or property, as to causes of action arising out of
such acts or such ownership, if a statute of the state so provides at the time when
the cause of action arises.4 5
The Restatement goes further and states that a nonresident individual who
does business within the state is subject to jurisdiction of the state for
causes of action arising out of business done within the state if a statute so
provides. 46 These two sections cover the theory that individual nonresi-
dents can be subject to suit within the state because of acts they have done
within the state. The driving of an automobile is dangerous to life and
property, therefore nonresident motorists are subject to suit.
In Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,47 Mr. Justice McReynolds stated: "Iowa
treats the business of dealing in corporate securities as exceptional and sub-
jects it to special regulation. '48 Both the sale of securities and the operation
of motor vehicles are dangerous to the general public, and for that reason
it has been held that special regulation by a state can subject a nonresident
doer of those acts to in personam jurisdiction. The courts, by holding
such acts to create jurisdiction for suits arising therefrom in the state
where the acts are committed, are merely affording a further protection
to the injured. The idea that a state cannot acquire jurisdiction over a
nonresident unless it is for acts done by the nonresident that are dangerous
to life or property or where the state feels that these specific acts are
exceptional and require special legislation as in the Doherty & Co. case,
is one that could be inferred to cover almost any type of suit. The in-
juries done to a person or to property are the basis for most of our legal
actions, such as tort and contract. Because a nonresident drives a motor
vehicle on Illinois highways he is subject to suit.49 The nonresident vendor
of securities5" and the nonresident insurer 5' are subject to the jurisdiction
of the Illinois courts by proper legislation. Why cannot the same rules
be applied to any acts of a nonresident which may create a lawsuit when
the legislature specifies such acts? There is no logical reason why this
cannot be so.
Other states have statutes similar to Section 17 of the Illinois Civil
45 Rest., Conflict of Laws § 84 (Supp., 1948).
46 Ibid. § 85. 48 Ibid., at 627.
47294 U.S. 623 (1935). 49 111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 95 Y, § 23.
50111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 121Y2, §§ 137.8 and 137.10.
51 1l. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 73, § 724.
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Practice Act which have been upheld. In the case of Compaiia De Astral,
S.A. v. Boston Metals Co.,52 in determining the validity of a Maryland
statute that subjected any person to its jurisdiction in any cause of action
arising out of a contract made within the state or liability incurred for acts
done within the state, the court stated:
The nonresident motorist cases have shattered any argument to the effect
that a single transaction by a nonresident may not be made the basis for amena-
bility to suit in the state where the transaction occurred. The Doherty & Co.
case has rendered untenable any contention that a contract made within a state
cannot serve as the basis for a suit in that state against a nonresident party to the
contract.
58
When Vermont was considering its statute subjecting a nonresident
to its jurisdiction for making a contract with a resident of Vermont to
be performed in Vermont or committing a tort in whole or in part in
Vermont against the resident of Vermont, the court held the statute
constitutional. 54
It may be said that the doctrine of forun non conveniens is applicable
in balancing the respective interest of the local plaintiff and the nonresi-
dent defendant.5 5 With regard to contacts or ties inside the state, most of
the witnesses are within the state and the law of the local state should
govern the acts of the nonresident when done within the state. Besides the
desire the state has to see that justice is done to its own residents, the state
may also contend that its courts are in a better position than those of any
other state to arrive at a correct decision in the case, since the law to be
applied is the local law of which its courts alone have judicial notice, and
the facts are local facts, which means that the witnesses will probably be
more readily available in the local state than elsewhere.
There is no real injustice to the nonresident defendant if he causes or
engages in acts within the state to cause him to submit to the jurisdiction of
the state courts for injuries he has caused. The English courts have made
rules for the assumption of jurisdiction over absent nonresidents in sub-
stantially all cases where the cause of action arose in England.5 6
The case of Flexner v. Farson,7 which once blocked the assertion of ju-
risdiction over a nonresident individual not present within the state, has
long been distinguished.58 The fact that a state does not have the power to
52 205 Md. 237, 107 A. 2d 357 (1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
53 Ibid., at 366.
54 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664 (1951).
55 Compafiia De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A. 2d 357 (1954),
cert. denied 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
56 See Rules of Court 1883 Order XI, v. 1 and amendments.
57 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
58 Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 871, 890-91 (1919).
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exclude a nonresident individual because of the privileges and immunities
clause is of no consequence, for the power of a state to exclude a corpora-
tion from intrastate business no longer has any bearing on jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation in the absence of express consent, the doctrine
of "implied consent" being dead.5 9
It is reasonable to expect that a statute, providing for proper service of
process on nonresident individuals who do the acts specified in the statute
within the state and for jurisdiction over the nonresidents with respect to
causes of action arising out of those activities, would be found constitu-
tional. In the case of Gillioz v. Kincannon6° the Arkansas Supreme Court
relied on the International Shoe Co. decision and held that the statute6' did
not violate any constitutional right of the nonresident individual defend-
ant.
In speaking of their statute, the court said:
It does not violate the due process clause since it requires a legal basis for
jurisdiction, that is the nonresident, defendant, must have done some business,
work or service within the State. It does no violence to the privileges and im-
munities clause because it does not discriminate between nonresidents but
places them upon the same basis as residents.6 2
Although the International Shoe Co. case involved jurisdiction over a non-
resident corporation, the doctrine is being applied to nonresident individ-
uals. 63 In the light of all of these cases, the acts which submit a nonresident
individual as well as a corporation to the Illinois jurisdiction under Section
17 of the new Civil Practice Act appear to be sufficient to acquire juris-
diction and appear to be constitutional.
Part two of Section 17 allows service of process outside of Illinois on
the nonresidents who have submitted to the court's jurisdiction for causes
of actions arising out of the acts they have done inside the state. This sub-
stituted service will have the same force and effect as personal service
within the state. In Milliken v. Meyer,6 4 a resident of Wyoming was
served outside the state under a state statute providing for such service on
residents of the state who cannot be found within the state.65 The service
59 For the death of the doctrine of "implied consent" see the opinion of Judge L.
Hand in Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S.D.N.Y.,
1915); Beale, Conflict of Laws § 89.7 (1935); Henderson, The Position of Foreign
Corporations in American Constitutional Law 87-96 (1918).
60 213 Ark. 1010, 214 S.W. 2d 212 (1948).
e1 Ark. Acts (1947) No. 347.
82 Gilioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark. 1010, 1014, 214 S.W. 2d 212, 216 (1948).
63 Ritholz v. Dodge, 210 Ark. 404, 196 S.W. 2d 479 (1946); Wein v. Crockett, 113
Utah 301, 195 P. 2d 222 (1948); Interchemical Corporation v. Mirabelli, 260 App. Div.
224, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 522 (1st Dep't, 1945).
64311 U.S. 457 (1940).
5 SWyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) §§ 5636 and 5641.
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outside the state was held sufficient notice to satisfy the due process clause
of the Constitution. The court said: "Enjoyment of the privileges of resi-
dence within the state and the attendant right to invoke the protection of
its laws, are inseparable. from the various incidences of state
citizenship.
Why cannot it be said that the enjoyment of the privilege to make con-
tracts and do other acts within the state with the right to invoke the pro-
tection of the state laws be, as in relation to domicile, the reciprocal right
of the State to cause submission to its jurisdiction for actions arising out of
these specific acts enumerated in the statute? All the Constitution requires
as to service is that it gives "reasonable assurance that the notice will be
actual."'67 The sending of notice by ordinary mail by the Secretary of
State after substituted service upon him has been held sufficient.68 What
would be better notice than service of the summons personally on the de-
fendant?
The struggle by the states to acquire jurisdiction over nonresidents is
finally nearing its goal. It seems only fair that a nonresident should be per-
sonally liable in the state where he has created the injury. The state where
the action arose could try the case better because of its courts having ju-
dicial notice of their own laws, and also because the witnesses and evi-
dence in the case would most certainly be in the local state. Section 17 of
the Illinois Practice Act is most welcomed as in line with the gradual de-
velopment of jurisdictional concepts.
66 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
67 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
68 Wagenberg v. Charleston Wood Products, 122 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.S.C., 1954).
ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
Evidence used in convicting the defendant of violating the California
gambling laws had been obtained by the concealment of listening devices
on defendant's premises and by numerous forcible entries and seizures
without warrants. In reversing his convictions, the California Supreme
Court, in People v. Cahan,1 declared that the evidence used in convicting
the defendant was seized in violation of both the California and U.S. con-
stitutional provisions regarding search and seizure, and that such illegally
obtained evidence should not have been entertained. The court expressly
overruled its previous decisions (of some thirty-five years) about admis-
sion of evidence secured through an unlawful search and seizure,2 laying
emphasis on the fact that its new rule is not founded upon constitutional
1282 P. 2d 905 (Cal., 1955).
2 People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922); People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal.
535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909); and "the cases based thereon."
